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[2005년 제 3차] A Theory of Dynamic Bank Loan Rate Clustering

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This paper proposes a dynamic model of self-policing strategies among the banks, leading to profit-maximizing collusion in quoting non-competing loan rates i.e. loan rate clustering. Consequently, the banks discourage the sensitive borrowers from shopping around in search of lower loan rates. Rather than relying on the behavioral assumption such as the consumers’ naivety in explaining the prevalence of rate clustering, the current paper provides an explanation for the clustering under the rationality assumption. As a result, a new policy implication for the loan rate clustering would result in, justifying the government intervention with the bank loan rate.
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2005_08_학술_송수영_.pdf
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